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Introduction 
Market-based instruments (MBI’s) are advocated because of their presumed lower 
economic cost in comparison with conventional regulatory instruments. The 
environmental effectiveness of the MBI is typically assumed to be the same as that of the 
conventional alternative (Crocker, 1966; Dales, 1968; Montgomery, 1972). Recent 
experience with cap-and-trade systems has confirmed the economic advantages of MBI’s 
(Ellerman et al., 2000; Carlson et al., 2000; Ellerman et al., 2003) and failed to find a 
degradation of environmental performance (Burtraw and Mansur, 1999; Swift, 2000). As 
a result, MBI’s, and especially cap-and-trade systems, have become widely accepted in 
the policy community. Recognizing this circumstance, opponents of the use of MBIs tend 
to attack the assumption that the environmental performance is equal (Clear the Air, 
2002; Moore, 2002). Their argument is that, while the economic performance may be 
better, the environmental performance is worse, and that the increased environmental 
damages outweigh the savings in abatement cost.  
This paper makes the contrary argument that the experience with the cap-and-
trade programs suggests that at least this form of MBI may be more environmentally 
effective than the usual command-and-control alternatives, in addition to being more 
economically efficient. The evidence rests mainly on the SO2 cap-and-trade system 
created by Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (also known as the Acid Rain 
Program), but corroborating evidence emerges from the Northeastern NOx Budget 
Program and the RECLAIM programs for trading NOx and SO2 emissions in the Los 
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Angeles Basin. Despite the small sample, the reasons for the observed better performance 
appear to be capable of more general application. 
Two definitional issues must be discussed first. The alternative to a cap-and-trade 
program is commonly described as command-and-control regulation. If ever economists 
have managed a semantic triumph, it is command-and-control, for it is hard to imagine a 
less appealing term for the latter part of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st 
century. Command-and-control is also not a very precise term for identifying the 
essential difference between the contending instruments for the requirement to surrender 
allowances can be seen as a command that will control aggregate emissions. The 
important distinction is that the command does not extend to the production decisions of 
individual firms and applies only to the aggregate level of emissions.  An instruction is 
given to each individual firm, namely to surrender an allowance, but it is no different 
than the practical (and legal) requirement to pay for any other input into production. The 
firm is not faced with a regulatory prescription concerning how much to emit or what 
control equipment to use, only a requirement to pay for emissions whatever their level. 
Accordingly, I have adopted the less value-laden and, I believe, more accurate term, 
prescriptive regulation, to describe the conventional alternative to cap-and-trade systems 
and more generally MBI’s. As pointed out presciently by Shabman, Stevenson, and 
Shobe (2002), the essential distinction concerns who makes the abatement decision, the 
regulator or the firm, not whether some command exists.  
The second definitional clarification concerns environmental effectiveness. By 
this term, I mean the proximate environmental goal, not the underlying environmental 
problem, which the proximate goal is presumed to solve. The relation between proximate 
goal and underlying environmental problem is a matter of program design and program 
design must figure in any broad definition of environmental effectiveness. Nevertheless, 
there would appear to be no tight link between instrument choice and good program 
design, which can be faulty as easily for MBI’s as it can for alternative prescriptive 
measures. While some instruments may lend themselves more readily to the adoption of 
appropriate proximate goals, the focus of this paper is the achievement of the proximate 
goal that I assume to be well chosen for the underlying environmental objective.  
   
The Title IV Story2 
Four environmentally advantageous features 
Four features describe the environmental performance of the Acid Rain Program. 
First, a large reduction of emissions was accomplished relatively quickly—in the fifth 
year following passage of the enabling legislation. Second, the schedule of emission 
reduction was accelerated significantly as a result of banking. Third, no exemptions, 
exceptions, or relaxations from the program’s requirements were granted. Four, the “hot 
spots” that were feared to result from emissions trading have not appeared.  
The first two features are illustrated in Figure One which shows the relationship 
between the cap, actual emissions, and several estimates of what emissions would have 
been absent Title IV for those units required to be subject to Title IV beginning in 1995, 
the “big dirties” as they are sometimes called.  
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Source:  Ellerman et al. (2000) as amended with data for more recent years based on EPA’s annual 
compliance reports. 
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The story shown by this picture is remarkable in two respects. The program caused a 
significant reduction of SO2 emissions in the fifth year following enactment of the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments and the first year in which the program was effective. 
Moreover, most of the reduction observed in 1995 was due to banking, which was not 
mandated, but a form of voluntary, early action on the part of program participants. 
Banking implies that the early “over-compliance” will be followed by later “under-
compliance,” as can be observed in the first three years of Phase II; however, if a positive 
discount rate is attached to the timing of the benefits of emission reduction, this behavior 
constitutes a net environmental gain. During the entire five years of Phase I, emissions 
were reduced by twice as much as was required to meet the Phase I cap. On a yearly 
basis, the annual emission reduction has increased steadily from 3.9 million tons in the 
first year, 1995, to 4.4 million tons in 1999, the last year of Phase I, and to 6.9 million 
tons in 2002, a 77% increase in abatement by the eighth year.  
EPA often notes that Title IV has achieved 100% compliance.3 This curious 
statement requires some interpretation since US environmental regulation is not 
characterized by widespread legal violations of statute or regulation. What is meant is 
that the program was implemented without the granting of the exemptions, exceptions, or 
relaxations of the regulatory requirement that are typically issued to avoid the undue 
hardship that can result when a more or less uniform mandate is imposed on sources 
exhibiting cost heterogeneity. Since the sources incurring less onerous costs never step 
forward to request more stringent regulation and the regulator does not have the 
information or will to impose a compensating tightening of the standard on these units, 
deviations from the presumed performance are all in one direction. The Acid Rain 
Program avoided this loosening bias through the trading mechanism, which automatically 
provided compensating reductions and made them cheaper than seeking some form of 
regulatory exemption. 
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The term “hot spots” refers to the possibility that with emissions trading the 
emission reductions might be avoided by the sources who contribute the most to 
environmental damage. A well-designed trading program would make hot spots 
impossible, but the practical requirements of program design and implementation will 
often allow this possibility. In the Acid Rain Program, the fear was that the required 
emission reductions would not be made in the Midwest, which was the source of the 
emissions most responsible for acidification in the Northeast, but in other areas such as 
the Southeast. As it turned out, most of the emission reductions did take place in the 
Midwest. Sources in the eight main Midwestern states (PA, WV, OH, IN, IL, KY, TN, 
MO) have provided about 80 % of the nationwide emission reduction achieved by Title 
IV while accounting for about 50% of current emissions and about 60% of what 
emissions would have been absent Title IV.  
It is hard to imagine an alternative command-and-control program that would 
have had equal environmental performance, even assuming that such a program could 
have achieved the legislative consensus accorded to Title IV after nearly a decade of 
stalemated proposals that would have mandated scrubbers and other prescriptive 
standards. Although there is surprisingly little ex post evaluation of the performance of 
conventional prescriptive regulations, they are typically not characterized by quick 
implementation with significant emission reductions relatively soon after enactment, nor 
by voluntary actions that have the effect of accelerating required emission reductions. 
More usually, implementation occurs only after a long period of regulatory rulemaking, 
administrative proceedings, and litigation as participants seek to shape the rules and to 
gain some form of relaxation and competitive advantage over other firms.  
Reasons for Better Environmental Effectiveness 
 
Only one of the four aspects of environmental performance noted above can be 
attributed to a specific design feature: the acceleration of the required emission reduction, 
which is clearly due to the banking provisions of Title IV (Ellerman and Montero, 2002). 
The remaining environmental features—quick implementation, 100% compliance, and 
the absence of hot spots—reflect the more fundamental characteristics of the program, 
namely, a flexible, decentralized, property rights system.  
   
Quick implementation occurred because there was comparatively little for EPA to 
do in the way of regulatory implementation once the statute was enacted.4 More typically, 
EPA must translate general Congressional intent into specific, concrete and enforceable 
objectives that can be applied to specific sources. In the case of the SO2 allowance 
trading program, all that EPA needed to do, after Congress had established a system of 
freely tradable emission rights and distributed those rights, was to set up the reporting 
and accounting system needed to ensure adequate enforcement. While very important, 
this task is much less demanding and time-consuming than what is usually required. 
More importantly perhaps, the radical redefinition of EPA’s role greatly reduced affected 
firms’ interest in EPA’s administrative proceedings. Since regulatory implementation did 
not involve prescribing the abatement and the costs individual sources will incur, the 
economic interest of affected firms was much less engaged and there was much less 
administrative involvement, political intervention, and litigation than normally 
characterizes the implementation of Congress’ intent in environmental matters. The issue 
that had the most impact on individual firms’ profits, the allowance allocation had been 
decided and the rest depended on an impersonal and inscrutable market and how well the 
firm used the allowances it had been allocated. Furthermore, it is quite a different matter 
to sue Congress than it is to sue the EPA Administrator for alleged arbitrary and 
capricious action. It is revealing that the most significant litigation in the implementation 
of Title IV concerned the one area in which EPA had some discretion in allocating 
allowances: those for units that were voluntarily brought into the program in Phase I as 
substitution and compensation units.  
                                                 
4 Nat Keohane makes the valid and interesting point that the issue is when the “clock” starts. It could be 
argued that the highly visible scrap over rents that accompanies the allocation of grandfathered allowances 
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than concocting and agreeing upon special regulatory provisions to achieve the same ends.  The enactment 
of Title IV is instructive. The legislative proposal embodying this program was introduced in July 1989 and 
enacted in October 1990, a very short time in comparison to the decade-long, deadlocked debate on several 
prescriptive acid rain control proposals that preceded the proposal embodying Title IV. Joskow and 
Schmalensee (1998) describe the “majoritarian consensus” that was achieved through the allocation of SO2 
allowances and which seems to have eluded earlier legislative proposals lacking this facilitating feature.  
   
What EPA terms 100% compliance reflects another little noticed feature of the 
simple, property rights system that Congress established with Title IV.   Compliance 
became cheaper than seeking the various forms of relaxation that characterize 
conventional regulatory programs. Firms facing relatively high costs of compliance in 
prescriptive programs can reduce those costs only be petitioning for and receiving some 
type of dispensation.  This involves non-negligible transaction costs and a less than 100% 
probability of success. Consequently, the decision to seek some form of relaxation 
depends on a comparison of the abatement cost savings from a successful petition, its 
likelihood, and the cost of obtaining that dispensation.   
This trade-off confronts the regulator with an unenviable choice in a conventional 
regulatory program. Lower transaction costs reduce the inequities involved in applying 
the rule, but they also encourage more petitions and less compliance with the original 
mandate. Conversely, higher transaction costs result in greater compliance, but also a 
more inequitable incidence of the regulatory requirement and greater political resistance. 
Cap-and-trade systems avoid this dilemma entirely. Where a market can be assumed, 
which has proven to be the case for the cap-and-trade systems in the United States, firms 
facing relatively high costs of abatement incur very low transaction costs in purchasing 
abatement by others. Thus, it becomes cheaper for these firms to comply than to seek 
some relaxation of the standard. Moreover, the existence of a market removes the 
primary reason for seeking relaxation: unique hardship due to the uniform application of 
a rule to source-specific circumstances. No one is uniquely disadvantaged in a market 
with many buyers and the highest cost is that of a permit. The happy result is a regulatory 
system in which compliance has been made cheaper than seeking some type of 
relaxation. While much is made of the ability of emissions trading to provide cheaper 
abatement options to firms facing relatively higher abatement costs, this compliance 
enhancing, environmentally beneficially feature of cap-and-trade systems has been little 
noticed.  
The lack of hot spots in the Acid Rain Program might be seen as accidental in that 
the cheapest sources of abatement were also the sources of the most damaging emissions, 
but there is more to this correspondence than happenstance. It reflects the circumstance 
that the cheapest abatement is typically found where the largest sources are located and 
   
these sources are usually the greatest contributors to the underlying environmental 
problem. Most deep abatement technology, like scrubbing, is capital intensive and the 
per-ton cost depends how many tons are removed per MWe of capacity. Higher 
utilization of the source and higher sulfur content of the combusted coal means more tons 
of abatement over which the fixed capital cost can be spread and lower total abatement 
cost per ton. Thus, where capital-intensive, deep-abatement technology is an option, 
market systems will direct abatement to relatively larger and more heavily utilized 
sources with relatively high emission intensities. And, if these sources are the most 
damaging from an environmental standpoint, the experience with Title IV suggests they 
will abate first. A further implication of this result is that broader markets can be formed 
where reason exists to believe that the pollution problem is caused mostly by the larger 
and more polluting sources.  
Is Title IV an exception? 
Title IV’s SO2 emissions trading program is widely recognized as successful, and 
perhaps exceptional, so that the relevant question is always whether the results from this 
program can be generalized. Neither of the two other major cap-and-trade programs in 
the United States, the Northeastern NOx Budget Program, and the RECLAIM programs 
in the Los Angeles Basin, have been studied as extensively as the Acid Rain Program. 
Nevetheless, they do provide support, as discussed below, for the argument that cap-and-
trade programs are more effective environmentally than alternative command-and-control 
programs. They also provide clearer evidence of a tendency for cap-and-trade approaches 
to supplant conventional prescriptive regulation, which is evident in the adoption of Title 
IV after years of stalemated legislative proposals to reduce SO2 emissions by more 
conventional means. This tendency is the more remarkable in that, unlike the Acid Rain 
Program where Congressional action provided the required legal authority, these 
programs were implemented through administrative action by regulatory bodies that 
possessed the legal authority to impose command-and-control measures with equivalent 
environmental effect.  
   
The NOx Budget Program 5 
The NOx Budget Program is a multi-state, regional program that was formed for 
the purpose of attaining the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for 
ground-level ozone in the Northeastern United States. The 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments mandated a standard of reasonably available control technology (RACT) 
for all sources located in non-attainment areas beginning in 1995, and it also formed a 
Ozone Transport Commission (OTC) to coordinate action among the thirteen 
Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states and the District of Columbia to end the persistent 
non-attainment along the Northeastern Corridor. Negotiations among these states led to a 
Memorandum of Understanding in 1994 that established a three-phase program of control 
of NOx emissions from electric utility and large industrial boilers.  Phase 1 was a re-
labeling of the RACT standard that took effect in 1995, but it was recognized that further 
NOx emission reductions would be required to achieve attainment. Phases 2 and 3, 
beginning in 1999 and 2003, consist of a progressively more stringent cap-and-trade 
program encompassing eleven of the fourteen jurisdictions during the ozone season (May 
through September) when the formation of ground-level ozone occurs.6  Beginning in 
2004, the third phase will be extended to cover most of the states east of the Mississippi 
River in what is known as the NOx SIP Call.  
Although the phase 2 emissions trading program differs in important aspects from 
the Acid Rain Program—for instance in placing limits on the use of banked allowances—
this phase has been successful in reducing NOx emissions in the Northeast. EPA 
compliance reports frequently note that ozone-season NOx emissions are 60% below 
1990 baseline levels, but two-thirds of this reduction was accomplished in the first phase 
that did not involve emissions trading. A more accurate statement for the purpose of this 
paper would be that second phase cap has reduced emissions by about 30% over the level 
achieved by the earlier RACT requirement and that the third and final phase, which has 
started this year, will effect another 35% reduction. Thus, the Northeastern NOx cap-and-
trade program will have reduced emissions by about 50% from what had been achieved 
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under the prescriptive RACT standard. The level of emissions to be achieved in the 
aggregate and the basis for determining the cap and for allocating allowances is the level 
of emissions that would have resulted from the application of a relatively tight emission 
rate standard (0.15 lbs. NOx/mmBtu) to all sources in the 1990 baseline year. 
The interesting question about this program is why a cap-and-trade mechanism 
was chosen for the later, more stringent phases instead of simply prescribing the more 
demanding 0.15 lbs. NOx/mmBtu standard for all affected units. A source-specific 
emission rate limit would have been more in keeping with well-established regulatory 
practice in the United States.  
One explanation might be that environmental regulators were swept up with the 
enthusiasm for market-based instruments that characterized this time, but this is a group 
that is generally not suspected of such sentiment. A more likely explanation is that 
regulators had come to recognize the limits of the conventional prescriptive approach for 
controlling air emissions and that they turned to the most practicable alternative to 
achieve the desired reductions in sources of pollution.  They may also have concluded 
that the costs of a conventional program would too high to be politically acceptable and 
been honest enough to admit that they did not possess the information to impose an 
efficient command-and-control program.  
A further factor influencing the choice of cap-and-trade programs may have been 
a greater willingness to the part of the owners of affected sources to accept this type of 
market-based instrument when the allowances are distributed to them for free. Any form 
of MBI would have provided the flexibility to achieve the environmental goal at least 
cost, but only grandfathered permits would provide higher value rents to incumbents than 
they would receive under conventional regulatory programs, which convey similar rents, 
especially when new entrants face more stringent standards. The new rights have the 
advantage of being more secure than the contingent rights embodied in conventional 
programs, and they are separable from the facilities to which they are granted.7   
                                                 
7 Much of the regulatory intervention and litigation surrounding the implementation of command-and-
control regulation can be seen as jockeying for the competitive advantage and associated rents created by 
these programs. 
   
The RECLAIM Programs 8 
 
The RECLAIM NOx and SO2 programs provide even clearer evidence of the 
tendency to supplant existing regulation with a cap-and-trade approach to achieve further 
increments of emission reduction. Like the NOx Budget Program, the RECLAIM 
programs are aimed at bringing a particular region, the Los Angeles Basin, into 
attainment with the NAAQS. In this case however, an explicit command-and-control 
program to bring the region into attainment by 2010—the 1989 Air Quality Management 
Plan—had already been developed, but its implementation, which would have involved 
130 specific control measures, would have been costly and slow. Three years of 
negotiation between regulators and the regulated eventuated in agreement in late 1993 on 
two phased-in cap-and-trade programs, one for NOx and the other for SO2, that would 
achieve the desired level of aggregate emissions in ten years, or by 2003, seven years 
sooner than in the 1989 Plan. Facilities participating in these programs were then exempt 
from the prescriptive requirements contained in the 1989 Plan as concerns NOx and SO2 
emissions. 
As was the case with the Northeastern NOx Budget Program, regulators seem to 
have realized that proceeding in the conventional manner would impose too high a cost to 
be politically practicable and that they lacked the information to devise an efficient 
command-and-control program. At the same time, RTCs, or RECLAIM Trading Credits 
as allowances were called in these programs, were granted to incumbent firms in 
perpetuity. The long and sometimes difficult negotiations concerning the allocation of 
these allowances indicates that firms were aware of the value being conveyed and it is 
reasonable to assume that this feature made them more willing to agree to the measures 
being proposed.  
The environmental effectiveness of the RECLAIM programs has been 
comparable to those of the other cap-and-trade programs. As of 2001, both NOx and SO2 
emissions have been reduced by about 40% since the program’s start in 1994. In 2003, 
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when fully phased in, the emission reduction from pre-program levels will be 50%.9 The 
SO2 cap has been met in each of the eight years since the program started. The NOx cap 
was exceeded in 2000 by 3,294 tons (16%) and in 2001 by 28 tons (0.25%) as a result of 
the electricity market problems in California in these years. The limited amount of 
banking and borrowing allowed through the use of overlapping cycles reduced the 
exceedences in each of these years by about half and those without sufficient RTC’s on 
an individual facility basis paid a $15,000/ton mitigation fee to fund off-system emission 
reductions and had the amount in exceedence deducted from future allowance allocations.  
This exceedence of the NOx cap is unfortunate, but it must be placed in context. 
The events of 2000-01 in California’s electricity market led to an extraordinary call on 
old generating plants in the Los Angeles Basin that were not equipped with NOx emission 
control devices because heretofore they have been dispatched for only a few hours a year 
to meet peak demand (Joskow, 2001). The unanticipated call on these units to meet 
electricity demand increased the demand for RTC credits to cover the resulting NOx 
emissions beyond what could be provided within the temporally constrained time period 
within which RTC credits are valid (one year with some banking and borrowing possible 
because of overlapping compliance cycles). The result was 1) unprecedented high prices 
(up to $90,000/ton), 2) the establishment of the $15,000/ton mitigation fee, 3) the 
temporary removal of electric utility units from the cap-and-trade system, and 4) the 
imposition of mandates on those units to retrofit NOx emission control devices. These 
units are now proposed for re-entry into the NOx cap effective January 1, 2004.   
The relevant question in assessing this performance is how the command-and-
control program that RECLAIM supplanted would have fared under the same 
circumstances. For one thing, the exceedences would not have been recognized, much 
less compensated. The only argument for better environmental performance by the 
alternative system is that it would have succeeded in having NOx abatement equipment 
installed, prior to the summer of 2000, on the generating units that were the source of the 
problem, thereby avoiding the large spike in emissions. The prior low utilization of these 
                                                 
9 The reduction in the number of RTCs distributed annually from 1994 through 2003 declined by 70% for 
NOx and 60% for SO2, but in both cases the annual caps were set intentionally to be initially non-binding. 
Since banking is not allowed, the early excess RTCs had no effect on eventual compliance.  
   
units and the high cost of capital-intensive retrofits make such an assumption debatable at 
best. Also, given the high price of NOx allowances since the summer of 2000, it is hard to 
imagine that owners of these units would have resisted retrofitting these units, unless they 
expected the units to return to the earlier level of low utilization. Accordingly, mandating 
the retrofit of these generating units will have the effect either of prescribing what would 
have been done anyway in response to the higher prices and expected higher utilization, 
or of providing very high cost protection against future allowance price spikes.  
Concluding Observations and Qualifications  
Critics of the use of market-based approaches will argue that the adoption of cap-
and-trade programs reflects a public policy fad or, at least, public policy experimentation 
in an inappropriate domain. If so, then the decisions to adopt these programs were 
fortunate in revealing instruments that are not only less costly but also more 
environmentally effective. However, another explanation, less dependent on serendipity, 
is that conditions have changed. Today’s environmental problems are not as obvious as 
before, and further increments of emissions reduction are more costly even when 
efficiently accomplished. Results-oriented environmental regulators have recognized that 
the familiar blunt instruments do not work as well in these new circumstances and that 
they do not have the information needed to design and administer conventional programs 
efficiently, assuming even that they can be adopted and implemented in the face of high 
costs. Moreover, changes in information technology have helped in making data-
intensive monitoring and reporting of emissions and the tracking of allowances cheaper 
and feasible over a broader range of environmental applications (Kruger et al., 2000).10 
Finally, the political requirements for gaining meaningful agreement by all relevant 
parties, whether for Congressional enactment or administrative implementation, make 
cap-and-trade programs with initially grandfathered allowances an obvious choice among 
the array of MBIs.11  All in all, the experience with these programs indicates a new 
                                                 
10 Rosenzweig and Varilek (2003) provide an insightful description of the problems of handling the 
required data for one of the first experiments in emissions trading, the lead-in-gasoline trading program. 
11 As reflected in current legislative proposals to effect further reductions in SO2 and NOx, both ends of the 
political spectrum seem in agreement that some allowances will have to be grandfathered initially and that 
ultimately all allowances would be auctioned. The differences concern the initial share and the phase-out 
schedule with the Bush Administration’s Clear Skies Proposal starting with 99% grandfathering and a 50-
   
pragmatism in which regulators have come to recognize the political and economic limits 
of their ability to prescribe source-specific emission reductions and the firms subject to 
the regulation have come to accept the costs involved in effecting emission reductions 
conditional on the receipt of improved rights to allowed emissions.  
It is not surprising that this new pragmatism should lead to the emergence of an 
explicit property rights approach. By giving legal recognition to the right to emit that is 
conveyed by conventional regulation and in making that right separable from the 
regulated asset, legislators have enabled the emergence of markets that provide the 
incentive for recipients of these rights to comply and to use the information available to 
each to make efficient abatement choices.  Whether they recognize it or not, legislators 
have adopted the simple rule, suggested a decade ago by Laffont and Tirole (1993), that 
does not place impossibly high informational demands on regulators and yet provides the 
incentive and flexibility for firms to do the right thing.12    
The argument presented here is not that the extensive body of environmental 
regulation that has been developed and administered in the United States over the past 
three decades has been ineffective. Clearly, it has been effective. The issue is one of 
relative environmental effectiveness, just as is the usual argument for lower economic 
costs. Still, if the experience with the admittedly small sample of cap-and-trade programs 
can be generalized more broadly, the policy implications for choice of instrument are 
even stronger than is commonly assumed.   
                                                                                                                                                 
year phase-out while some Congressional proposals would award incumbents with no more than 20% of 
the allowances initially and phase out the grandfathering over ten years. 
12 I am indebted to Paul Joskow for pointing out the implicit adoption of the model propounded by Laffont 
and Tirole. 
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